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Abstract
According to Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) the wave function ψ is
considered neither a concrete physical item evolving in spacetime, nor an object
representing the absolute state of a certain quantum system. In this interpretative
framework, ψ is defined as a computational device encoding observers’ informa-
tion; hence, RQM offers a somewhat epistemic view of the wave function. This
perspective seems to be at odds with the PBR theorem, a formal result excluding
that wave functions represent knowledge of an underlying reality described by some
ontic state. In this paper we argue that RQM is not affected by the conclusions
of PBR’s argument; consequently, the alleged inconsistency can be dissolved. To
do that, we will thoroughly discuss the very foundations of the PBR theorem, i.e.
Harrigan and Spekkens’ categorization of ontological models, showing that their
implicit assumptions about the nature of the ontic state are incompatible with the
main tenets of RQM. Then, we will ask whether it is possible to derive a relational
PBR-type result, answering in the negative. This conclusion shows some limitations
of this theorem not yet discussed in the literature.
Keywords: Relational Quantum Mechanics; PBR Theorem; Ontic States; Epistemic
States;
Accepted for publication in Foundations of Physics
∗Contact Information: Université de Lausanne, Section de Philosophie, Lausanne, Switzerland. E-
mail: Andrea.Oldofredi@unil.ch





2 Setting the Stage: RQM and the PBR Theorem 4
2.1 RQM in a Nutshell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Harrigan and Spekkens’ Distinction: ψ-Ontic and ψ-Epistemic Models . 7
2.3 The PBR Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3 The Peaceful Coexistence 11
4 A Relational PBR Theorem? 13
5 Conclusions 18
1 Introduction
In his seminal essay on Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM), Carlo Rovelli claims
that “the experimental evidence at the basis of quantum mechanics forces us to accept
that distinct observers give different descriptions of the same events” (Rovelli (1996), p.
1638). Such a claim, which entails a radically novel perspective on the interpretation of
Quantum Mechanics (QM), finds its roots in Einstein’s idea behind special relativity, i.e.
that physical observations depends on the specific reference frame in which interactions
occur. Furthermore, these insights on the meaning of non-relativistic quantum theory are
also motivated by considerations coming from quantum gravity and general relativity,
theories where, according to Rovelli, the relational features of spacetime clearly emerge.
Interestingly, Rovelli claims that RQM is the most natural result of the unification
of these ingredients and their application to the formalism of standard quantum the-
ory taken at face value. In the light of this interpretative framework, the notion of
an observer-independent state of physical systems is abolished in favor of a perspecti-
val, observer-dependent description of reality (cf. Rovelli (1996, 2016, 2018), Laudisa
and Rovelli (2019)). In RQM various observers may provide diverse descriptions of the
same sequence of physical events, and such descriptions are equally correct and non-
contradictory, despite their being different. As a consequence, the values of measurable
properties are relative to specific observers.
Rovelli’s theory has remarkable foundational implications. We mention a few:
• A novel meaning of the wave function collapse, simply considered an update of the
information possessed by a certain observer relatively to the value of a measured
observable. In RQM nothing physical is actually collapsing in measurements in-
teractions, and this is why the tension between the unitary Schrödinger dynamics
and the collapse postulate is dissolved;
• A new treatment of Wigner’s friend scenarios, both old and new. In RQM the
descriptions of a quantum measurement provided byWigner’s friend—who actually
measured a certain observable on a quantum system obtaining a definite result—
and by Wigner himself—who has no clue about the outcome—are equally correct
and non-contradictory (Frauchiger and Renner (2018); Bong et al. (2020));
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• The commitment to a subjective interpretation of quantum probabilities (cf. Smer-
lak and Rovelli (2007)), without being a subjective version of QM as e.g. Quantum
Bayesianism, since RQM provides an ontic representation of physical systems, as
recently argued by e.g. Oldofredi and Lopez (2020).
This paper focuses on yet another aspect of RQM, namely its interpretation of the
wavefunction. According to Rovelli, the wavefunction is considered neither a concrete
physical item dynamically evolving in spacetime (or in configuration space), nor an
object representing the absolute state of a certain quantum system (cf. Rovelli (1996,
2016)). In this context, ψ is defined as a useful computational device encoding the
information available to a particular observer about a specific system. Hence, it is gen-
erally claimed that RQM offers an epistemic view of the wavefunction. This perspective
about the nature of the quantum state, however, seems to be at odds with a formal
result obtained by Matthew Pusey, Jonathan Barrett and Terry Rudolph—known as
the PBR theorem—according to which all ontic models reproducing the predictions and
the statistics of the Born rule must be ψ-ontic (cf. Pusey et al. (2012)). Alternatively
stated, as Leifer (2014) pointed out, such a theorem excludes the possibility that the
wavefunction represents the knowledge of an underlying reality described by some ontic
state (usually denoted λ). Hence, one would be led to conclude that RQM is in plain
contradiction with the PRB theorem.
In this respect, Laudisa and Rovelli (2019) claim that
[T]he wave function, and more in general the quantum state ψ, are inter-
preted realistically in several presentations of quantum theory. From the
perspective of RQM, this is precisely what generates the confusion about
quantum theory (Rovelli 2018). RQM circumvents the theorems for the re-
ality of the wave function (Leifer (2014); Pusey et al. (2012)) because it is
not a strongly realist theory [...] which is an implicit assumption of these
theorems.
Although we agree that in RQM the wave function is not taken to be a real, concrete
object in itself, it should be noted that Rovelli’s theory can be properly considered a
realist formulation of quantum theory, as argued by several philosophers in the recent
years (cf. Dorato (2016), Candiotto (2017), Oldofredi (2020), and Calosi and Mariani
(2020)). Hence, we believe that Laudisa and Rovelli’s answer to the issue raised by the
PBR theorem can–and should—be developed and refined. Indeed, we think that there
is a deeper and more precise reason why RQM and the PRB theorem are not mutually
inconsistent. The main aim of the paper is exactly to investigate such a reason. We
are going to show why RQM is not affected by the conclusions of PBR’s argument and,
consequently, this alleged inconsistency can be dissolved.
In order to do this, we will thoroughly discuss the foundations of the PBR theo-
rem, i.e. Harrigan and Spekkens’ categorization of ontological models (cf. Harrigan and
Spekkens (2010)). More precisely, it will be argued that their implicit assumptions about
the nature of the ontic state λ are incompatible with the basic tenets of RQM. Con-
forming to this classification, λ is considered an observer-independent representation of
the state of a certain quantum system. However, the relational character of Rovelli’s
theory requires that, in order to define correctly what ontic states are, one has to use
completely different criteria w.r.t. those employed by Harrigan and Spekkens. According
to the main tenets of RQM, in fact, both ψ and λ must be relational, meaning that
• λ represents the ontic state of quantum systems relatively to a certain observer,
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• ψ stores information that a particular observer has relatively to a given system.
Thus, in the following sections we will carefully explain which assumptions RQM makes
about λ, and how they diverge from those employed by Harrigan and Spekkens. In
particular, it will be argued that Harrigan and Spekkens’ approach does not have the
necessary formal and ontological resources to be correctly applied to RQM. This has
a remarkable consequence—or so we contend: given that PBR theorem relies on such
a classification of quantum models, but the latter fails to capture some basic tenets of
RQM, one can safely conclude that Rovelli’s theory does not lie within the scope of the
theorem, avoiding any formal contradiction with it. In addition, we will ask whether it
is possible to derive a PBR-type result in the context of RQM. We will answer in the
negative. This conclusion also shows some limitations of the PBR-theorem that, to the
best of our knowledge, have not been discussed in literature.
The structure of the paper is the following: in Section 2 we introduce the essential
elements of our discussion, providing a brief description of RQM, Harrigan and Spekkens’
categorization of ontological models, and the PBR theorem (readers familiar with the
literature may skip this part, though our reconstruction of the PBR-theorem is somewhat
unorthodox). In Section 3 we will argue that RQM and the PRB theorem can peacefully
coexist, whereas in Section 4 a relational PBR-type result will be discussed taking into
account several scenarios involving different observers. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Setting the Stage: RQM and the PBR Theorem
2.1 RQM in a Nutshell
RQM was first proposed in Rovelli (1996). In its original formulation it consisted of two
parts:
• A re-interpretation of the usual quantum formalism;
• A derivation of this formalism from basic, general principles.
The focus of this paper is restricted to the first part. We follow closely Rovelli
(1996) here. Rovelli explicitly understands RQM as a “generalization” of the standard
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. This generalization is twofold. First,
there is no privileged notion of an “observer”—thus every quantum system is on a par :
[R]elational QM is Copenhagen quantum mechanics made democratic by
bringing all systems onto the same footing (Rovelli (2018), p. 11).
Thus, the notion of an “observer” does not
[M]ake any reference to conscious, animate, or computing, or in any other
manner special, system (Rovelli (1996), p. 1641).
In the light of this, any physical system can count as an “observer”. Second, there is no
privileged notion of “measurement”—thus every physical interaction is on a par :
[M]easurement is an interaction like any other (Rovelli (2018), p. 5).
There are four “basic tenets” of the Copenaghen interpretation that, when suitably
adjusted, RQM is supposed to retain:
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Eigenfunction-Eigenvalue Link (EEL). A physical system s has a definite value v
of an observable O iff the state of s is an eigenstate of O that belongs to v.
Schrödinger Dynamics. The state of s evolves according to the Schrödinger equation
H(t)|ψ(x, t)〉 = i~ ∂
∂t
|ψ(x, t)〉. (1)
“Collapse” Postulate. At the time of measurement the state of s collapses into one
of the eigenstates of O with probability given by the Born rule.
Born rule. If an observable quantity O is measured:
• the result will be one of the eigenvalues oi of O;
• the probability P to obtain eigenvalue oi is given by 〈ψ|Pi|ψ〉.
As we will see in due course, caution is due to interpret the Collapse Postulate. As
of now, we think RQM is best appreciated by focusing on what Rovelli calls “The Third
Person” (or “third system”) problem. Consider an observable O with two eigenvectors
|+〉 and |−〉, with eigenvalues +1 and −1 respectively. Suppose we have a physical
system s1, that, at time t1, is in a superposition of O-states:
|ψ〉s1 = (c1|+〉+ c2|−〉)s1 (2)
A second system s2 interacts with s1 in what the Copenaghen interpretation will call
a “measurement” of O, and finds s1 to have value O = +1. According to the “Collapse”
Postulate” we have:
t1 → t2 (3)
(c1|+〉+ c2|−〉)s1 → |+〉s1
The result of the quantum interaction between s1 and s2 is that s1 acquires a definite
value property, namely O = +1—this much follows from EEL. Consider now a system
s3 that does not interact with either s1 or s2. Its description of the quantum situation
encoded in (3) will only refer to the Schrödinger Dynamics. Thus, we get:
t1 → t2 (4)
((c1|+〉+ c2|−〉 ⊗ |init〉)s12 → (c1|+〉 ⊗ |plus〉+ c2|−〉 ⊗ |minus〉)s12
where, as conventions, s12 is the quantum system comprising s1 and s2 and states |+〉
and |plus〉 are correlated in the obvious way.1
It is immediately clear that the descriptions of the very same events given by s2 and
s3 are very different: according to s2, s1 is in an eigenstate of O. Thus, s1 has the
definite value property O = +1. This is not the case for s3. According to s3, s1 is not in
an eigenstate of O, and therefore does not have any definite value property of O.2 This
is what Rovelli calls Main Observation:
1Clearly, the same goes for |−〉 and |minus〉.
2Different metaphysical readings of this situation have been proposed in the literature. Dorato (2016)
argues in favor of a dispositionalist account, whereas Calosi and Mariani (2020) argue for an indetermi-
nate account.
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Main Observation. In QM different systems may give different accounts of the same
sequence of events.
RQM can be understood as that interpretation of quantum mechanics that, by con-
trast with more familiar ones, holds that both descriptions (3) and (4) are correct. But,
how can that be? These descriptions are clearly different, as we saw already. One
possibility is simply that, both are correct, and yet one (or both) is only a partial de-
scription description of quantum phenomena. Rovelli rejects such a possibility explicitly.
Quantum formalism, at least in its usual applications, is complete:
Completeness. QM provides a complete and self-consistent scheme of description of
the physical world.
There seems to be one other possibility. Descriptions (3) and (4) are different,
correct, and complete descriptions of the relevant quantum events because they are
correct relatively to different relativization targets. That is to say, description (3) is a
correct and complete description of quantum events at t1 → t2 relative to s2, whereas
description (4) is a correct and complete description of the very same quantum events
relative to s3. This is in effect the basic tenet of RQM:
Basic Tenet of RQM. RQM dictates a relativization of states and observables of
physical systems to other physical systems.
In Rovelli’s own words:
[Q]uantum mechanics is a theory about the physical description of physical
systems relative to other systems, and this is a complete description of the
world (Rovelli (1996), p. 1650).
[T]he actual value of all physical quantities of any system is only meaningful
in relation to another system (Rovelli (2018), p. 6, italics in the original).
We could at this point, slightly change the formalism in order to incorporate rela-
tivization explicitly in the formalism itself. For instance we could write O = v1(si/sj)
for “si has value v1 of observable O relative to sj”. More importantly for our purposes,
we suggest to write:
|ψ〉si/sj (5)
for “s1 is in state ψ relative to sj”, and
λsi/sj (6)
for “si has an ontic state λ relative to sj”—the rationale behind this direct incorpora-
tion in the formalism will be clear in due course. If so, the quantum phenomena we
started from, i.e., the ones in the “Third Person Problem”, will be more perspicuously
represented—at t2—by:
|ψ〉s1/s2 = |+〉s1 (7)
|ψ〉s12/s3 = (c1|+〉 ⊗ |plus〉+ c2|−〉 ⊗ |minus〉)s12
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Before we move on to the next section we should pause to consider a crucial is-
sue. Rovelli himself presents RQM using quantum states, and frequently uses talk of
“relativization of states”. This clearly does not entail that he recognizes a substantive
ontological reading of such quantum states. In effect, Rovelli is explicitly skeptical about
such an heavy-weight ontological reading. He writes:
[T]he conceptual step was to introduce the notion of “wavefunction” ψ, soon
to be evolved in the notion of “quantum state” ψ, endowing it with heavy
ontological weight. This conceptual step was wrong, and dramatically mis-
leading. We are still paying the price for the confusion it generated (Rovelli
(2018), p. 2, italics added).
This will play a crucial role. As of now, it is unclear what the (alleged) “heavy
ontological weight” of the quantum state amounts to. Harrigan and Spekkens (2010)
provides a clear framework to define rigorously such a notion by classifying them either
as ontic or epistemic. To this we now turn.
2.2 Harrigan and Spekkens’ Distinction: ψ-Ontic and ψ-Epistemic
Models
In order to illustrate the distinction between ontic and epistemic states, let us consider a
straightforward example of a classical particle (cf. Leifer (2014)). In classical mechanics
one assigns a precise position q and a momentum p to it, and the pair (q, p) constitutes
the phase space point of the object under consideration. This point describes the physical
state of the particle, i.e. its ontic state, which exists objectively and independently of
any observer.3 However, if one does not have precise information about the position
and momentum of this physical system, then one can represent the uncertain knowledge
about its ontic state by a probability density f(q, p) over phase space. Interestingly,
f(q, p)—the epistemic state—represents mere knowledge, and does not describe any
inherent property of the particle. Different observers may not have equal knowledge of the
state of our particle. If so, it is possible to associate several epistemic states to the same
ontic state. In effect, such epistemic states—i.e. such probability distributions—may
overlap in the particle’s phase space. By contrast, the particle’s ontic state is uniquely
determined by the point (q, p).
Harrigan and Spekkens’ categorization of ontological quantum models employs the
ontic/epistemic distinction in order to determine whether the quantum state ψ has to
be interpreted as representing some underlying reality or just observers’ knowledge of
particular systems (cf. Harrigan and Spekkens (2010)). This constitutes the very theo-
retical heart of the PBR theorem. The taxonomy is framed within operational quantum
theory, an approach to QM where primitive notions consist exclusively in preparations
procedures, i.e. instructions about how to prepare physical systems in certain states, and
measurements performed on such states. Harrigan and Spekkens claim that
[I]n an operational formulation of quantum theory, every preparation P is as-
sociated with a density operator ρ on Hilbert space, and every measurement
M is associated with a positive operator valued measure (POVM) {Ek}.
(In special cases, these may be associated with vectors in Hilbert space and
3Its future positions and momenta, moreover, are univocally determined via Hamilton’s equations,
meaning that at any time the ontic state of the particle will be described by (q, p). In addition, every
other observable property of the relevant physical system is a function of (q, p).
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Hermitian operators respectively.) The probability of obtaining outcome k
is given by the generalized Born rule, p(k|M,P ) = Tr(ρEk) (Harrigan and
Spekkens (2010), p. 128).
The main aim of such operational models, they continue, is to provide probabilities
p(k|M,P ) of outcomes k for some measurement M performed on prepared systems,
given a set of preparation instructions P . When a measurement is carried out, a mea-
suring device will “reveal something about those properties” (ibid.). In this respect,
Harrigan and Spekkens assume that a complete specification of the properties of a given
individual physical system under scrutiny is provided by its ontic state, denoted by
λ.4 More precisely, λ provides a complete specification of the preparation procedures
that are performed on a particular quantum system, and hence, it yields a complete
description of its measurable properties.5 Furthermore, they underline that although
an observer knows exactly the preparation procedures prior the performance of a cer-
tain measurement, she may not have complete knowledge about the ontic state λ of
the system under investigation. Thus, it follows that while the future outcomes k of
a certain measurement are determined by λ—and therefore the probability to obtain
them is given by p(k|λ,M)—the epistemic state of the experimenter is represented only
by p(λ|P ). Notably, an observer that has incomplete information about λ assigns “non-
sharp” probability distributions over the ontic state space Λ, i.e. multiple probability
distributions can be assigned to the very same ontic state, exactly as in the classical
case discussed a few lines above.
Against this background, Harrigan and Spekkens go on to provide conditions to
classify ontological quantum models as ψ−ontic or ψ−epistemic. Briefly and roughly, a
model is defined ψ−ontic if the ontic state λ can be consistently described by a unique
pure state. Consequently, in ψ−ontic models different quantum states correspond to
disjoint probability distributions over the space of ontic states Λ. More precisely, a
model is said to be ψ−ontic if “for any pair of preparation procedures, Pψ and Pφ,
associated with distinct quantum states ψ and φ, we have p(λ|Pψ)p(λ|Pφ) = 0 for all
λ” (Harrigan and Spekkens (2010), pp. 131-132). That is, observers’ epistemic states
associated with different quantum states do not overlap in Λ. Conversely, a model is
defined ψ−epistemic if there exists ontic states consistent with more than one pure state;
in such epistemic models, thus, there are quantum states that correspond to overlapping
probability distributions in Λ. In this operational context, this implies that agents’
epistemic states may overlap, i.e. there exist preparation procedures Pψ, Pφ such that
p(λ|Pψ)p(λ|Pφ) 6= 0. Hence, the ontic state λ can be consistently represented by both
quantum states ψ and φ:
[I]n a ψ−epistemic model, multiple distinct quantum states are consistent
with the same state of reality—the ontic state λ does not encode ψ” (ibid.,
p. 132).
In the case of ψ−epistemic models, then, the quantum state refers to observers’
incomplete knowledge of reality, it is not a description of reality itself.
On top of that, Harrigan and Spekkens divide quantum models in ψ−complete and
ψ−incomplete. In ψ−complete models, the pure quantum state encodes every infor-
mation about the represented physical system. Moreover, in such models there is a
4As in the classical case discussed above, the ontic state λ belongs to an ontic state space Λ.
5It is worth noting, however, Harrigan and Spekkens use the term “ontological” in a much weaker
sense with respect to standard philosophical jargon: they simply mean that λ refers to something real in
the world, leaving many details regarding the metaphysics of quantum objects completely unspecified.
8
one-to-one relation between reality and its complete description provided by ψ. If one
knows the pure quantum state of a certain system under consideration, one has a com-
plete knowledge of its ontic state. Therefore, ψ−complete models are also ψ−ontic.
Examples of such models are given by standard QM, Everett’s relative-state formulation
(cf. Everett (1957)), the Many-World interpretation (cf. Wallace (2012)), and Wave-
Function Realism (cf. Albert (2013)).
If ψ does not represent reality completely, then a quantum model is ψ−incomplete.
Notably, ψ−incomplete models may be either ψ−supplemented or ψ−epistemic. In the
former case, the description of a physical system provided by ψ is supplemented by some
additional (or hidden) variables, whose value is generally unknown. In hidden variables
models, trivially, the quantum state provides partial or incomplete knowledge of the
system. Well-known examples of hidden variables models are Bohmian mechanics (cf.
Dürr et al. (2013)), Bohm’s pilot-wave theory (cf. Bohm (1952)), and Nelson’s stochastic
mechanics (cf. Nelson (1966)). Notably, also the class of ψ−supplemented models is
ψ−ontic. Finally, in the case of ψ−epistemic models, ψ represents agents’ incomplete
knowledge of reality, and not reality itself. Typical examples of such a kind of models is
given by QBism (cf. Caves et al. (2002)) and RQM.6
In the rest of the paper we will critically analyze some implicit assumptions in Har-
rigan and Spekkens’ categorization. In particular we will argue that some requirements
concerning the nature of λ are in tension, if not inconsistent, with basic ontological
tenets of RQM. As we pointed out already, this will have notable consequences for the
relation between RQM and the PBR theorem, a formal result that we are now going to
introduce.
2.3 The PBR Theorem
The PBR theorem was heralded as the single most important result in quantum foun-
dations after the Bell-theorem.7 It allegedly establishes that an epistemic reading of the
quantum state cannot recover quantum predictions. Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph phrase
the result in the form of a no-go theorem:
[T]his Article presents a no-go theorem: if the quantum state merely repre-
sents information about the real physical state of a system, then experimen-
tal predictions are obtained that contradict those of quantum theory (Pusey
et al. (2012), p. 475).
We present here a streamlined reconstruction of the result. The argument depends on
different assumptions, but we will mention just a few:
Preparation Independence. It is possible to prepare different physical systems in
such a way that their ontic states are independent, i.e. uncorrelated.
Harrigans and Spekkens Definition of Epistemic State. Quantum states |ψ〉
and |φ〉 associated with preparation procedures Pψ and Pφ are epistemic states iff
6From these distinctions some conclusions can be derived. Firstly, there cannot be models which are
simultaneously ψ−complete and ψ−epistemic. Thus, if a model is ψ−complete, it must be ψ−ontic (cf.
Lemma 6, Harrigan and Spekkens (2010), p. 133). Conversely, if a model is ψ−epistemic, it cannot be
ψ−ontic, since it describes only observers’ knowledge and not any underlying physical reality. Secondly,
if a model is ψ−incomplete, then it can either be ψ−ontic, as in the case of hidden variable models, or
ψ−epistemic.
7This judgement was given by Anthony Valentini, cf. Reich (2011).
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p(λ|Pψ)p(λ|Pφ) 6= 0.8
Measurement Response. If two quantum systems are prepared in such a way as to
fulfill Preparation Independence, measurements respond solely to the proper-
ties of the system that is being measured.
We already discussed Harrigans and Spekkens Definition of Epistemic State.
As for Measurement Response, let us quote directly from the original PBR-paper:
[T]he outcome of the measurement can only depend on the physical states
of the two systems at the time of measurement (Pusey et al. (2012), p. 476).
As we will see, this will play a crucial role for our discussion. As of now, let us go back
to proof of the PBR theorem.
Let s1 be a quantum system prepared with two different procedures Pψ and Pφ. Let
〈ψ|φ〉 = 1√
2
. Consider a two-dimensional Hilbert space H spanned by |ψ〉 = | ↑〉 and
|φ〉 = |+〉 = 1√
2
(| ↑〉 + | ↓〉). Suppose now | ↑〉 and |+〉 are epistemic states. Then the
ontic state of s1 should be compatible with both and we can write:
p(λ1|P↑) 6= 0, (8)
p(λ1|P+) 6= 0.
Prepare another system s2 in such a way that the ontic states of the two systems
are uncorrelated—as guaranteed by Preparation Independence. Then, by the same
argument:
p(λ2|P↑) 6= 0, (9)
p(λ2|P+) 6= 0.
Equations (8) and (9) are meant to capture that the ontic states of s1 and s2, λ1
and λ2 respectively, are compatible with both | ↑〉 and |+〉. Then, the complex system
s12 is compatible with the following tensor product states:
|ω1〉12 = | ↑〉1 ⊗ | ↑〉2 (10)
|ω2〉12 = | ↑〉1 ⊗ |+〉2
|ω3〉12 = |+〉1 ⊗ | ↑〉2
|ω4〉12 = |+〉1 ⊗ |+〉2
If the ontic state λ12 is compatible with all of them, we can write:




8We saw in the previous subsection this is really not the definition of an epistemic state, but rather
it is implied by the definition. The reason we use this will be clear in a minute.
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Set |−〉 = 1√
2

















(|+〉1 ⊗ |−〉2 + |−〉1 ⊗ |+〉2)
This measurement responds solely to the properties of s12, given Measurement Re-
sponse. Now, algebraic manipulation shows that
〈ω1|χ1〉 = 〈ω2|χ2〉 = 〈ω3|χ3〉 = 〈ω4|χ4〉 = 0 (13)
That is to say that for every measurement direction in (12) we can find a state of s12
in (10) that is orthogonal to it. In this case, standard quantum predictions yield that:




contradicting (11). Thus quantum states are not epistemic states. Or so the argument
goes.
3 The Peaceful Coexistence
Given the formal result above, it seems to follow that RQM contradicts the predictions of
standard quantum mechanics. The argument seems straightforward: according to Rov-
elli, ψ is to be interpreted epistemically. And the PBR theorem (allegedly) establishes
that an epistemic interpretation of quantum states cannot reproduce standard quan-
tum predictions. However, it is well-known that RQM is in perfect empirical agreement
with respect to the predictions and statistics of quantum theory, the PBR argument
notwithstanding. How can this be? How can we dissolve the tension between these two
apparently incoherent claims? In what follows we answer to these questions. 9
In order to show how RQM can escape the consequences of PBR theorem, we need
to focus on the implicit assumptions made by Harrigan and Spekkens concerning the
nature of the ontic state λ. In Section 2.2 we saw that ontological models are framed
within operational quantum theory, and that their basic ingredients are (i) properties of
individual physical systems associated with experimental procedures, and (ii) measure-
ments performed on such systems revealing the value of some such particular properties.
9To be clear: it is not the aim of the paper to provide a thorough defense of RQM. Rather, it is to
show that there the PBR-theorem does not proivde an argument against it.
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In effect, Harrigan and Spekkens assume that the ontic state λ of a quantum system pro-
vides a complete description of its inherent properties (Harrigan and Spekkens (2010),
p. 128)—i.e. attributes that objects instantiate in virtue of the way themselves are, inde-
pendently of any relation they stand in with external observers and/or contexts (cf. Lewis
(1986), p. 61). Moreover, λ provides an objective representation of quantum systems,
since the ontic state of a quantum object refers to an underlying physical reality whose
features do not depend upon any particular observer. Hence, according to Harrigan and
Spekkens, we can uniquely characterize a certain system through the specification of its
instantiated properties by specifying a list of preparation procedures. In the light of this,
λ is taken to be an observer-independent, complete description of physical systems.10
For these reasons, in ψ-complete models—as e.g. standard QM—the authors claim
that:
• variations of λ cause variations in the wave function ψ;
• there is a one-to-one correspondence (a bijective map) between ontic states of
physical systems and pure quantum states representing them, since there is a
unique correct description of the various quantum systems under consideration.
From these premises, it follows straightforwardly that if a certain λ can be described by
multiple ψ-s, then these ψs are taken to represent the incomplete knowledge of the ontic
state possessed by different observers. Hence, it is easy to understand why overlapping
probability distributions over Λ are defined as epistemic states: these represent the lack
of information (ignorance) of a certain observer about the complete specification of the
properties of a given system. Thus, if multiple wave functions can be ascribed to the
same λ, they equally fail to describe some property in the ontic state of the object at
hand.
These assumptions about the nature of λ are clearly violated in the context of RQM.
Recall the Third Person scenario presented in Section 2.1. In that case, it is clear upon
inspection that the ontic state of a particular system strictly depends on the perspective
of a given observer, since physical systems are represented by relational states. In effect,
according to the observer s2, the system s1 is in the |+〉 state, and thus, it has a definite
value for the observable O. By contrast, according to s3, s1 system is in a superposition
of states, and hence it does not possess any definite value for O. However, from the
Main Observation, we know that in RQM both s2 and s3 provide correct descriptions
of a given sequence of physical events. This immediately entails that in RQM the ontic
state of physical systems (and thereby their properties) depends on the perspective of a
specific observer, in plain contrast with Harrigan and Spekkens’ entire farmework.
Now, if the relational nature of quantum systems entails that their ontic states de-
pend on the specification of a certain perspective, then different observers can ascribe
diverse wave functions to the very same λ. Against this background, however, these
ψs do not represent epistemic limitations, such as, for instance, incomplete knowledge.
Rather, in RQM they simply reflect the perspectival nature of physical systems. Alter-
natively, given that physical systems in RQM are described by relational properties,
which by definition require the specification of a certain observer and/or context to be
meaningful, different observers may assign different ontic states to the same target ob-
ject, as in the already mentioned example of the Third Person problem—and as we are
about to see again in a different context. Such relational states, however, should be not
interpreted epistemically, but ontologically: they reflect that reality (and thus the ontic
10This is in line with the analysis in e.g. Oldofredi and Lopez (2020).
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states of quantum objects) is observer-dependent, or better, perspectival, contrary to
what Harrigan and Spekkens simply assume. It is thus clear that RQM employs com-
pletely different criteria to define what ontic states are with respect to those assumed
by Harrigan and Spekkens. In particular, according to Rovelli’s theory it is possible to
assign several ψs to the same observed system without necessarily be committed to a
ψ-epistemic view as defined by their classification. This entails that the wavefunction
must be relational as well: ψ can no longer be associated with a perspective-independent
ontic state, but rather with a relational λ, i.e. an underlying perspectival reality. Thus,
we conclude, according to RQM, both ψ and λ must be relational, that is:
• λ represents a quantum system always relatively to a certain observer,
• ψ stores information that a particular observer has relatively to a given system.
To sum up: given that in RQM an absolute representation of physical systems is un-
available by construction, there cannot be a one-to-one correspondence between λ and
ψ. Strictly speaking, there is neither an absolute, i.e. observer-independent, λ, nor an
absolute ψ. RQM allows to assign more than one ψ to the very same individual physical
system. Remarkably, such ψs are not interpreted as a manifestation of the ignorance
of the various observers, but are a simple consequence of the relational ontology of the
theory. As a matter of fact, one could see some irony here. Suppose we were to insist
that there must be a one-to-one correspondence between λ and ψ. Then, given that
different observers assign different λ-s to the same quantum systems, they do assign
different ψ-s as well.
Even if RQM supports a somewhat epistemic take on the quantum wavefunction, this
differs substantially from Harrigan and Spekkens definition of ψ-epistemic models. In
particular, although in RQM it is possible to ascribe multiple wave functions to the very
same system, it is not the case that these descriptions fail to capture certain intrinsic,
observer-independent properties instantiated by a certain physical system. There are no
such properties to be captured to begin with! Therefore, since the assumptions employed
to define what ontic states are in RQM differ completely with respect to those at play
in Harrigan and Spekkens (2010), we conclude that this classification does not have
the correct metaphysical and formal resources to deal with relational ontic states and
relational ψs. Thus, Harrigan and Spekkens’ classification cannot straightforwardly be
applied to RQM. This fact has a remarkable implication for our discussion: given that
the PBR theorem crucially relies on Harrigan and Spekkens’ classification of quantum
ontological models, as per the Harrigans and Spekkens Definition of Epistemic
States assumption, but the latter cannot be used to evaluate RQM, one can safely
conclude that RQM does not lie within the scope of the theorem. This means that when
Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph refer to ψ-epistemic model, they are not referring to RQM.
There is no contradiction between the epistemic interpretation of ψ in RQM and the
PBR result.
From such a conclusion, we can also infer a more general lesson, i.e. that it is not
necessarily true that the PBR theorem excludes every type of ψ-epistemic model, or
better, not every ψ-epistemic model contradicts the predictions and statistics of standard
QM, contra the main claim of the PBR argument.
4 A Relational PBR Theorem?
In the light of the above, a natural question arises: could we find a relational counterpart
of the PBR-theorem? That is, could we give an analogous result once the relativization of
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states, observables and ontic states characterizing RQM is taken explicitly into account?
In this section we provide an argument that answers the question in the negative.
From our reconstruction, the PBR theorem crucially depends on three assumptions.
Our argument in Section 3 can be read as a challenge to the second, namely to the Har-
rigan and Spekkens Definition of Epistemic State assumption. In particular, it
can be read as challenging the exhaustiveness of Harrigan and Spekkens’s classification.
This is because we argued that their categorization importantly leaves out RQM—or
more precisely, that it cannot be consistently used to evaluate RQM.11 The Prepara-
tion independence assumption has been the focus of a great deal of scrutiny as well.12
To our knowledge, however, Measurement Response has not yet been properly dis-
cussed. We now turn to argue that RQM sheds interesting new light on this assumption
as well. In particular, as we are going to show, it seems that its use in the context of
RQM undermines one crucial step in the derivation of the PBR-theorem.
As we saw in Section 2.1, according to the main tenet of RQM, states and observ-
ables must always be relativized to other physical systems functioning as observers. We
suggested to incorporate this relativization directly into the formalism; going back to the
inner workings of the PBR-theorem this results in the following. An observer s, which
is a physical system like any other, prepares two quantum systems s1 and s2 which can
be both compatible with the epistemic states |ψ〉 and |+〉 encountered in Section 2.3,
implementing two different protocols Pψ and Pφ and using two copies of the same prepa-
ration device. We have to recall here that in RQM every quantum state is epistemic,
since it refers to the knowledge that a given observer has about a certain system. More-
over, although s knows the instructions to prepare the systems s1, s2, the agent “may
nonetheless have incomplete knowledge of λ” (Harrigan and Spekkens (2010), p. 128). As
a consequence of RQM, after the preparations protocols have been implemented, s1 and
s2 acquire a particular ontic state relative to s, i.e. λ1/s, and λ2/s respectively—where,
for the sake of simplicity, we assumed that relativization to the same physical system
is consistent.13 Hence, equations (8) and (9) should be replaced with their relational
counterparts:
p(λ1/s|P↑/s) 6= 0, (15)
p(λ1/s|P+/s) 6= 0
11This assumption can be challenged on other grounds as well, as done for instance in Hance et al.
(2021). Hance et al. argue that wavefunctions can represent simultaneously reality and knowledge,
contrary to Harrigan and Spekkens definitions which are mutually exclusive. Moreover, the paper
shows on the one hand that such exclusiveness is simply presupposed, and on the other that it is neither
necessary, nor sufficient to capture the relation existing between the ontic state λ and ψ.
12For critical discussions about the validity of this premise cf. Mansfield (2016), Schlossauer and Fine
(2012, 2013, 2014) and references therein. Interestingly, dropping this assumption altogether, Lewis
et al. (2012) showed with an explicit model that it is mathematically possible to interpret quantum
states as agent’s information concerning an underlying physical state. In addition, Mansfield (2014)
shows that the PBR theorem “breaks down” in models that relax Preparation independence.
13To this regard, we have reasons to believe that our assumption is consistent. Indeed, discussing the
third person scenario we saw a similar situation; an observer s2 interacted with a system s1 which before
the interaction was in a superposition of O-states, and found s1 to have a definite value for the observable
O. In the case discussed in the present section, an observer s prepares two systems interacting directly
with them, thus, they will acquire a certain state relative to s. Here we make a standard maneuver in
operational quantum mechanics, namely to consider preparations as measurements.
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and
p(λ2/s|P↑/s) 6= 0, (16)
p(λ2/s|P+/s) 6= 0.
Interestingly, in this scenario Preparation Independence is trivially met since both
systems are prepared at the same site by the same agent s who can freely choose among
the possible protocols how to prepare s1 and s2. After their preparation, suppose that
the two systems are then brought together to form a complex system s12 as required in
the proof of the PBR theorem. Referring to this, it is worth noting that Pusey et al.
(2012) implicitly assume that the composite system s12 is simply given by the product
of the independent physical states of the individual systems forming it. While this not
a mereologically trivial fact, we accept it for the sake of the argument; then, the ontic
state of the complex system s12 relative to the agent s is given by λ12/s.14 Moreover,
let us suppose that the ontic state λ12/s is compatible with all possible tensor product
states of (10), so as to get the relativized counterpart of (11), namely (17):




Now the complex system s12 is measured. But note that, according to Measure-
ment Response, the measurement system s∗—which is another observer with respect
to s—will respond solely to the properties of s12. The crucial question in a relational
context becomes: The properties of s12 relative to what other system? To answer this
question, we have to take into account two crucial facts: on the one hand, any system
is on a par in RQM, and, on the other hand, physical objects do not possess inherent
absolute properties per se, independently of any observer. Hence, it is reasonable to
assume that the measurement system will respond to the properties of s12 relative to
s∗, represented by the relativized ontic state λ12/s∗. In this respect, it is crucial to note
that there is no guarantee that, in RQM, λ12/s = λ12/s∗ . On the contrary, in general
they will differ. Thus, no contradiction will arise. In effect, suppose that the relativized
counterpart of (14), that is (18) below, holds true:
p(λ12/s∗ |Pω1/s∗ ) = 0 (18)
p(λ12/s∗ |Pω2/s∗ ) = 0
p(λ12/s∗ |Pω3/s∗ ) = 0
p(λ12/s∗ |Pω4/s∗ ) = 0
Still, (17) and (18) constitute no contradiction because of the difference in their rela-
tivization targets. Thus, we can safely claim that one cannot derive the conclusion of
the PBR theorem in this relational context. At this juncture, one may claim that we
14Cf. Schlossauer and Fine (2013) for critical remarks concerning this mereological issue.
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over-simplified the relevant details of the PBR theorem, by relativizing states of s1 and
s2 to the same observer.
Let us discuss another experimental situation involving two observers, say Alice and
Bob, located at two different sites. We will show that neither in this case one can derive
a relational PBR-like result.15 According to this scenario, Alice’s task is to prepare the
quantum system s1 in one of the possible epistemic states |+〉 or | ↑〉, as required by the
PBR argument (cf. Section 2.3). Bob has the same assignment for the quantum system
s2. Let us assume for the sake of argument that Preparation Independence holds.
Then, from this experimental setting, the ontic state of s1 relative to Alice, i.e. λ1/A
should be compatible with the following probabilities:
p(λ1/A|P↑/A) 6= 0, (19)
p(λ1/A|P+/A) 6= 0.
Similarly for Bob:
p(λ2/B|P↑/B) 6= 0, (20)
p(λ2/B|P+/B) 6= 0.
It is worth noting that in virtue of Preparation Independence, Alice’s preparation
of s1 is not influenced by (i.e. is independent of) Bob’s preparation of the system s2,
and vice versa. Interestingly, Alice does not know how Bob prepared s2. Therefore she
has no information about the final state he obtained after the implementation of the
preparation protocols. Thus, according to RQM, from Alice’s perspective the system s2
will have an ontic state λ2/A which differs from λ2/B. More precisely, given the limited
knowledge that Alice has about Bob’s preparations—she only knows that he is preparing




| ↑〉 ⊗ |up〉Bob +
1√
2
|+〉 ⊗ |plus〉Bob. (21)
Hence, from her perspective the physical state of s2 is represented by a superposition of
the | ↑〉 and |+〉 states each entangled with Bob’s state after the preparation, something
allowed—and indeed required—by RQM, as we saw in Section 2.1 while discussing the
Third Person problem. Indeed, the state in (21) has notable similarities with (4). As we
pointed out several times already, Alice’s description of λ2 is correct even though it is
not equivalent to Bob’s, who does not obtain a superposition of states in virtue of his
interaction with the system s2 via the preparation device. An analogous argument holds




| ↑〉 ⊗ |up〉Alice +
1√
2
|+〉 ⊗ |plus〉Alice (22)
which is clearly different from the λ1/A obtained by Alice after her preparations.
This fact is relevant for our discussion—and more generally for the PBR-like argu-
ment we are exploring—since Alice and Bob have to send their prepared systems s1 and
15The generalization of our conclusion to N observers is trivial, and it is left as an exercise to the
reader.
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s2 to a measuring device s∗, the third observer of this scenario. As in the previous case,
s∗ will interact only with the composite system s12 formed by the product of the indi-
vidual states of s1 and s2. Remarkably, since λ1/A 6= λ1/B and λ2/A 6= λ2/B, it follows
that Alice and Bob will provide different relational descriptions of the ontic state of the
complex system s12. In effect, given (21) and (22), we expect that λ12/A 6= λ12/B. In
particular, for Alice the ontic state λ12 can be represented by these two possible options:




















while for Bob the ontic state λ12 of s12 is given by the following states:




















It is straightforward to see that these descriptions are incompatible with the products
states of (10). However, from Alice’s perspective we have that:
p(λ12/A|Pω1/A) 6= 0, (25)
p(λ12/A|Pω2/A) 6= 0.
Once again, similarly for Bob:
p(λ12/B|Pω3/B ) 6= 0, (26)
p(λ12/B|Pω4/B ) 6= 0.
Interestingly, the probabilities in (25) will be zero according to Bob’s perspective. By
construction Bob cannot find any superposition-state for s2. Similarly, the probabilities
in (26) will be zero for Alice. These results simply follow from the relativization of states
in RQM. Thus, there is no contradiction between Alice’s and Bob’s perspectives.
Finally, if Alice and Bob send their prepared systems s1 and s2 to the measure-
ment device s∗, the latter will interact with a composite system s12/s∗ which will not
contain any superposition of states contrary to the cases represented in (23) and (24),
so that the observer s∗ will not find the complex system s12/s∗ in any of the states
|ω1〉A, |ω2〉A, |ω3〉B, |ω4〉B. This fact is due once again to the relativization of states,
from which it follows that
λ12/s∗ 6= λ12/A, (27)
λ12/s∗ 6= λ12/B.
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In turn, given the ontic states defined in (23), (24), the inequality in (27), and from the
main tenet of RQM, it follows that:
p(λ12/A|Pω1/A) 6= p(λ12/s∗ |Pω1/s∗ ), (28)
p(λ12/A|Pω2/A) 6= p(λ12/s∗ |Pω2/s∗ ),
p(λ12/B|Pω3/A) 6= p(λ12/s∗ |Pω3/s∗ ),
p(λ12/B|Pω4/A) 6= p(λ12/s∗ |Pω4/s∗ ).
Therefore, the measuring device s∗ will interact with a composite physical system
having an ontic state completely different w.r.t. those described by Alice and Bob. As
in the previous case, then, the relativization of states implies that the three observers
involved in our scenario—namely Alice, Bob and s∗—will assign different ontic states
to the composite system s12, so that no contradiction can arise among these different
perspectives and standard quantum predictions. The conclusion stands: RQM is neither
vulnerable to the original PBR-theorem, nor to its relativized counterpart.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we discussed throughly the relation between RQM and the PBR-theorem.
This is because there is a prima-facie significant tension between the two. RQM suggests
an epistemic take on the quantum wavefunction, whereas the PBR theorem allegedly es-
tablishes that no epistemic interpretation is empirically equivalent to standard quantum
mechanics. This seems to threaten the empirical adequacy of RQM. We argued there is
no such threath. This sheds new light on both RQM and PBR. As for the former, it
forces us to accept that there is an epistemic reading of the quantum wavefunction that
is both (i) empirically adequate, and (ii) is not captured by extant characterization of
quantum epistemic states. As for the latter, it shows that there are limitations to the
very applicability of the theorem and its conclusion that have largely gone unnoticed in
the literature.16
16For insightful discussions on previous drafts of the paper we would like to thank [Redacted].
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